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"Law is the formal instrument of orderly change in society."'2
ODAY we come together to remember and to honor Ibrahim
Shihata (1937-2001),3 the former Director-General of the Organi-
zation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries ("OPEC") Fund for
International Development. For a long time he was general counsel of
the World Bank, where he presided over the International Centre for Set-
tlement of Investment Disputes and over the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency. When he retired after seventeen years, he was Senior
Vice-President and Special Adviser to the Bank's president.
I do not call him "Dr." Ibrahim Shihata; I do not even mention his
academic credentials from Egypt, his native country, and from the United
States, nor the many books which he authored. All of this does not even
scratch the surface of what he stood for. When he died after a long illness
on May 28, 2001, he was remembered for his honest willingness to serve
and for the human touch which he gave to all his endeavours. He was
much more than a magician of cash flows.
Lives of great men all remind us
•Professor of Law at the University of Muenster, Germany. Dir. Em. Institute for
International Business Law. This paper was presented before an audience of stu-
dents and scholars from over twenty countries as a Shihata Distinguished Lecture
before the SMU International Law Society as part of its cooperative London Fo-
rum Initiative with the SMU Law Institute of the Americas for promoting Devel-
oping Country Scholarship. The lecture was given in Fall 2004, when Professor
Grossfeld was a Distinguished Visiting Professor of Comparative Law at SMU.
1. HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, Curfew, in POEMS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 55,
56 (2000).
2. Robert C. Effros, The World Bank in a Changing World: The Role of Legal Con-
struction, 35 INT'L. LAW. 1341, 1347 (2001) (quoting Ibrahim F. I. Shihata).
3. See Id. at 1341-48; see also Daoud L. Khairallah, Dr. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata-A
Memoir, 35 INT'L LAW. 1337 (2001). Dr. Shihata's last article was The World Bank
and the IMF Relationship-Quo Vadis?, 35 INT'L LAW. 1349 (2001).
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We can make our lives sublime,
And, departing, leave behind us
Footprints on the sands of time;
Footprints, that perhaps another,
Sailing o'er life's solemn main,
A forlorn and shipwrecked brother,
Seeing, shall take heart again.4
But notwithstanding the poetical touch in his life, it is not a lawyer's
first job to discuss poetry. For this reason I will focus on a subject that
was of particular concern for him: corporate governance. It was an im-
portant part of his work, when the World Bank made corporate govern-
ance assessments across five continents, using as a benchmark the
"Principles of Corporate Governance" from the Organization of for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development.
This fits well into the concept of cash flows to which I just alluded be-
cause by far the most important cash flow in our global environment is
triggered by private actors- by corporations. Since the time of Bank of
Augusta,5 they have stood in the center of our financial world, pumping
up and distributing capital. They not only create the "cash flow of jus-
tice," but they also contribute to the "cash character" of our culture.
With Ibrahim Shihata's awareness of these often hidden powers, we
might find a proper cultural balance.
But I do not want to talk only about international economic law, or
more precisely about international financial law. I am speaking at a law
school, the Dedman School of Law, which is strongly devoted to the stu-
dents' interests. Therefore, it seems proper to address the subject of in-
ternational financing from a point of view that is closer to the students'
experience and more down to their earth, their professional prospects.
Therefore, I will start with corporation law, and I will then try to turn to
financial statements.
II. NEW BEGINNING
"Law without loyalty cannot strengthen the bonds of Empire."'6
A. SARBANES-OXLEY
Corporations are just everywhere; as profit or non-profit organizations,
they are accepted as our way of life. They are so firmly established as a
matter of course that only three years ago we learned about "The End of
4. HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, A Psalm Life, in POEMS AND OTHER WRIT-
INGS 3, 4.
5. See Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519 (1839).
6. Thomas Mohr, Law without Loyalty-The Abolition of the Irish Appeal to the Privy
Council, 37 THE IR. JURIST 187 (2002) (quoting Lord Balfour).
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History for Corporate Law."'7 But then Enron showed us that history had
not come to an end;8 corporate governance is a hot topic once again in
the wake of Sarbanes-Oxley. 9
B. OLD WINE
Law, says the priest with a priestly look,
Expounding to an unpriestly people,
Law is the word in my priestly book.
Law is my pulpit and my steeple. 10
Sarbanes-Oxley, with its creeping federalization of corporation law, in-
deed opened a new area, notwithstanding all the criticism trying to de-
fend the genius of American corporation law, 1 "the genius" being state
competition for corporate charters. Roberta Romano started the salvo of
criticism against the "quack corporate governance" of Sarbanes-Oxley
under the motto: "It's hard to argue logic in a feeding frenzy. ' 12 In her
eyes policy entrepreneurs were successful "in opportunistically coupling"
their ideas to Enron's collapse. 13 She argues that the act oversteps "the
traditional division between federal and state jurisdiction" without any
need for it.14
Her criticism is mainly directed toward the independent audit commit-
tee and executive certification of financial statements. These corporate
governance provisions "should be stripped of their mandatory force and
rendered optional .... ,,15 The matter should be left to competitive legal
systems: "the best path to ameliorating the misguided congressional pro-
mulgation of substantive governance mandates through SOX is to con-
form it to the states' enabling approach to corporate law.' 6 The "race to
the top" doctrine1 7 then appears as old wine 18 put into new bottles in
favour of Delaware's dominance as the corporate state of America.
7. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate
Law, 89 GEO. L. J. 439 (2001); see also REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANAT-
OMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004).
8. See Marleen O'Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children:
Investing in Our Future Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1255 (2004).
9. See Catharine E. Stark, Regulating Corporate Governance: Amended Rules of Pro-
fessional Conduct Allow Lawyers to Make the World a More Ethical Place, 53
CATH. U. L. REV. 1195 (2004).
10. Wyston Hugh Auden, Law Like Love, in COLLECTED POEMS 208 (Edward Men-
delson ed., London 1976).
11. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)
[hereinafter ROMANO, THE GENIUS].
12. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=596101.
13. Id. at 4.
14. Id. at 7.
15. Id. at 9.
16. Id. at 10.
17. ROMANO, THE GENIUS, supra note 11, at 148.
18. See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR SE-
CURITIES REGULATION (2002).
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C. OMISSIONS
I do not know whether Sarbanes-Oxley makes the world a more ethical
place, 19 but when criticising it, at least a few words should be said about
the present position of the effective markets theory, along with Adam
Smith's religious picture of the invisible hand. Does the market still have
genius status? Is it a firm basis for logic? Probably not:
"Law has not been replaced by the social sciences, and law has not
become a legal science. Applying market concepts to legal reasoning
is useful but it offers no simple answers, only new ways of under-
standing the underlying qualities and constraints of our exchange re-
lationships. Ultimately, we have no economic calculus that relieves
us from the challenge and opportunity of doing justice - we have no
escape from engaging in a normative discourse concerning the ethi-
cal and aesthetic values of law."'20
What about accounting 21 and rating22 as the conditions for market effi-
ciency? Today these trades hold all our financial apples-good and bad
alike. Without structural and financial transparency, "effective markets"
and "shareholder value" remain myths, remain catchwords in their truest
sense. There is often no reference to anti-takeover "poison pills" that
severely hamper the market in corporate shares.2 3 Should it be men-
tioned that increased liabilities under state law tend to be neutralized by
state law asset protection trusts? 2 4 Roberta Romano correctly alludes to
Delaware's success in keeping the incorporation state as the venue for
insolvency filings, 25 but does not call it opportunistic. Having all this in
mind, I wonder whether the criticism meets the urgent need for repair.
III. NEW FOCUS
"A nation's well being, as well as its ability to compete, is condi-
tioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level of trust
inherent in the society."'26
19. Cf. Stark, supra note 9.
20. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT 232 (2004).
21. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Corporate Governance: Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles v. International Accounting Standards?, 28 N.C. J. INT'L. L.
& CoM. REG. 847 (2003).
22. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Changing Concepts of Rules: Global Corporate Assess-
ment, 8 LAW & Bus. REV. AM. 341 (2002) [hereinafter Grossfeld, Changing
Concepts].
23. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in
Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Alma Cohen, Firm Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383 (2003).
24. See Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Professional Responsibility Issues Associated with Asset
Protections Trusts, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 561 (2004).
25. Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Corporate Reorganization/Global Corporate Govern-
ance: Imperfect Information and Credible Commitment, 4 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. &
Bus. 89 (2004) [hereinafter Grossfeld, Global Corporate Reorganization].
26. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROS-
PERITY 7 (1995); See also Ruben Kraiem, Leaving Money on the Table: Contract
Practice in a Low Trust Environment, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 715, 716
(2004).
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Corporations are not only everywhere, but they are likewise nowhere.
A corporation exists "only in contemplation of law, and by force of the
law; and where that law ceases to operate, and is no longer obligatory, the
corporation can have no existence. '2 7 Academic theory also tells us that
corporations do not really exist; rather, they are a convenient connection
point for a bundle of relationships from here to eternity-to legal immor-
tality.28 In spite of this we continue to discuss the issue in its global con-
text 2 9 by starting with the traditional concept: a corporation (derived
from the Latin corpus, meaning "body") is seen as a body of resources to
act as an entity producing all kinds of goods for chaotic markets. That is
why "the future of corporate governance" is often a synonym for re-
forming the current corporation law. 30 Instead of that, I would like to
start with the question of whether the lawyers' traditional views are still
realistically focused. Could it be that the traditional basis of knowledge
and expertise is retreating and that it cannot serve as the solid ground
which we could take for granted?
Let me indicate the direction in which I intend to go: the pre-tradi-
tional picture for a corporation was a "pump for capital," an instrument
that absorbs money from many small springs at the lowest possible cost.
Let me add to this the post-traditional view: the main emphasis of
Sarbanes-Oxley is on the accounting committee and executive certifica-
tion, both indicating a trend into fields that lawyers had previously disso-
ciated from corporation law. 3 1
IV. RACES
The preponderance of traditional corporation law for corporate gov-
ernment is illustrated by Delaware as the centerpiece of the discussion.
The "race to the bottom" 3 2 was substituted by "the race to the top," but
both topics are drying out, as it was recently formulated by Mark J. Roe:
"that which persists in Delaware is that which the federal authorities tol-
erate."'33 Sarbanes-Oxley has increased federal pressure on state corpora-
27. Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 584.
28. See Katsuhito Iwai, Persons, Things and Corporations: The Corporate Personality
and Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 583
(1999); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Corporations, Society, and the State: A De-
fense of the Corporate Tax, 90 VA. L. REV. 1193 (2004); and RONALD HARRY
COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW (1988).
29. See Catherine Valcke, Global Law Teaching, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 160 (2004); cf.
Bernhard Grossfeld, Chapter 4, Management and Control of Marketable Share
Companies, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, VOL.
XIII, BUSINESS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS (Arnold Conard chief ed.,1973).
30. See Thomas W. Joo, Race, Corporate Law, and Sharholder Value, 54 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 351, 352 (2004).
31. See Bernhard Grossfeld, Lawyers and Accountants: A Semiotic Competition, 36
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 167 (2001) [hereinafter Grossfeld, Lawyers and
Accountants].
32. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections on Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663 (1974), available at http://www.heinonline.org.
33. Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003).
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tion law.
To what extent is corporation law a prominent feature of a corpora-
tion's performance on capital markets? 34 Does it grant the social credit
on which investors rely? Would you invest in a Delaware corporation if
its shares were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion? Would you invest in a corporation that does not control its compli-
ance with Sarbanes-Oxley?
V. DIRECTORS' LIABILITY
But even if corporation law, seen in isolation, is still reliable, counter-
vailing powers are on the rise. There is a tendency to sharpen directors'
liability, 35 but by the same token the number of asset protection trusts is
increasing. Accordingly, even liability may no longer be what it seemed
to be before, an effective deterrent of improper activity. The new instru-
ments of debtor protection first spread from the Cook Islands, near New
Zealand, and from there to Alaska and Delaware. It remains controver-
sial whether American courts are willing to recognize Cook Islands
trusts, 36 but Delaware may be expected to grant full faith and credit to
creatures of its own jurisdiction.
The Santa Fe discussion 37 may get a new angle when claims under the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act run into state asset protection trusts. In Santa Fe
Indus. v. Green, the Supreme Court observed, with regard to Rule 10b-5
promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act, that "Congress did
not expressly provide a private cause of action for violations."' 38 It held
the cause of action to be "traditionally relegated to state law."'39 But the
Court also emphasized the appropriateness of its decision "in this in-
stance."'40 Has Sarbanes-Oxley changed the "instance" as a kind of "leg-
islative guidance? '41 And after all, Delaware has become a place of
refuge for insolvencies. 42
34. Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate
Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002); Bebchuck & Cohen, supra note 21; Robert
Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525 (2001).
35. William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Re-
view in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287 (2001).
36. Lawrence v. Goldberg, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Af-
fordable Media, L.L.C., 179 F.3d 1228 (9th Cir. 1999); Lischer, supra note 24.
37. Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 469 (1977); see also Bus. Roundtable v. Sec.
Exch. Comm'n, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (striking down SEC action to require
one-share, one-vote).
38. Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 477.
39. Id. at 478.
40. Id.
41. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 726 (2004)
42. Grossfeld, Global Corporate Reorganization, supra note 25; see also Harvey R.
Miller & Shai Y. Waisman, Does Chapter 11 Reorganization Remain a Viable Op-
tion for Distressed Businesses for the Twenty-First Century?, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J.
153 (2004); Stephen J. Lubben, Railroad Receivership and Modern Bankruptcy
Theory, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1420 (2004).
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VI. CYBERLEX 43
The Internet brought us CyberLex, and thereby new views on corpo-
rate law. The virtual entity corporation fits neatly into the world of
cyberspace; it is a natural candidate, or even a native of this new land.
Being an "artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in con-
templation of law,"'44 it is based on signs and on signs alone. The corpo-
ration finally meets the environment of its own creation. The
combination of new semiotics and new logistics changes the corporate
world. In a word, Internet technology is disrupting antiquated institu-
tional arrangements, and forces us to ask questions we did not think of
before. Corporate havens and offshore banking are booming;45 interna-
tional financial centers are blossoming.46
An English court once asked: "Can the Island of Tobago [the Robinson
Crusoe Island] pass a law to bind the rights of the whole world? '47 Al-
most 200 years earlier the answer was "no"; today the answer is "yes."
But the question remains: does the modem answer create social credit? 48
VII. NEW SEMIOTICS
Legal and cultural developments are not only driven by the natural but
also by the semiotic environment. Here a new giant appears on the hori-
zon. Given the importance of China and of Chinese expatriates in inter-
national production and trade, and given the strong position of Chinese
language and writing on the Internet, we will soon have to deal with cor-
porations, incorporated in foreign states, whose statutes we cannot read
and the "fuzzy logic" hermeneutics of which we do not know.
A difference in writing styles is often mentioned by way of anecdote
(exotism 49), whereas in reality it indicates a tremendous gap in
worldviews, given the social nature of literacy and the closeness between
literacy and cognition. 50 Different writings stand for different roots of
identity and for different concepts of order. Writing comes close to map-
ping: it maps the men-viewed environment and tells them how and where
to go. What are we going to do, when we are no longer able to under-
43. Bernhard Grossfeld, CyberCorporation Law - Comparative Legal Semiotics!
Comparative Legal Logistics, 35 INT'L LAW. 1405 (2001).
44. Id. at 1407.
45. Hale E. Sheppard, Rethinking Tax-Based Export Incentives: Converting Repeated
Defeats Before the WTO into Positive Tax Policy, 39 TEX. INT'L L.J. 111 (2003).
46. Frank C. Razzano, So You Want to be an International Financial Center... Are
You Prepared to Spit in the Giant's Eye?, 28 SEC. REG. L.J. 326 (2000).
47. Buchanan v. Rucker, 103 Eng. Rep. 546, 547 (1808).
48. Ruben Kraiem, Leaving Money on the Table: Contract Practice in a Low Trust
Environment, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 715 (2004).
49. Cf. Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).
50. W.N. Osborough, Law and the Spread of Literacy - Millenial Reflections on Bod-
dington's Plight, 35 THE IR. JURIST 36 (2000).
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stand or control the semiotic pattern? 51
VIII. EUROPEAN UNION
The regression of corporation law is not only characteristic of the
United States; it is likewise visible in Europe. There we witness a dra-
matic change towards the recognition of foreign corporations. In two de-
cisions, the European Court of Justice did away with the "seat theory" of
incorporation. 52 Under this rule a corporation had to be established ac-
cording to the law of the place where it has its central administration. 53
Now, corporations can be set up under the law of any member state re-
gardless of the place of the corporation's seat.54 The highest German
Federal Court transferred the new rule into the German-American Treaty
on Friendship, Commerce, and Shipping. This decision opened the door
for Delaware corporations.55 And not just for Delaware corporations:
other states will refer to most favored treatment clauses in similar trea-
ties. Just think of Japan and-one day or another-China.56
The situation might not be seen too pessimistically because of the
chance that European corporate governance structures will emerge. Har-
monized national corporate governance codes are mushrooming and the
European corporation will certainly set the standard.
IX. CORPORATE POWER
Unfortunately, we cannot take these changes light-heartedly. Though
history might not have normative power,57 "a page of history [can be]
worth a volume of logic."' 58 From there we learn that these entities with
unlimited life enjoy the privilege of unrestricted growth over time, cou-
pled with the power of interest and compound interest. Corporations are
centers of economic and political power in the hands of management. 59
We can recognize their strength from their fruits: their ability to trigger
cash flows.6° We cannot anthropomorphize these legal "persons" and we
51. Bernhard Grossfeld & Josef Hoeltzenbein, Globalization and the Limits of Lan-
guage(s): Comparative Legal Semiotics, 35 RECHTSTHEORIE 87 (2004) [hereinafter
Grossfeld & Hoeltzenbrein].
52. Bernhard Grossfeld, Loss of Distance: Global Corporate Actors and Global Cor-
porate Governance - Internet v. Geography, 34 INT'L LAW. 963 (2000).
53. Uberseering BV v. Nordic Construction Company Baumanagement GmbH
(NCC), 2002 E.C.R. 1-09919; RIW 2003, 957 (Inspire Art).
54. Werner Ebke, The European Conflict-of-Corporate-Laws Revolution: Ueberseer-
ing, Inspire Art and Beyond, 38 INT'L LAw813 (2004); Christian Kersting & Clem-
ens Philipp Schindler, The ECJ's Inspire Art Decision of 30 September 2003, and its
Effects on Practice, 4 GERMAN L. J. 12 (2003).
55. NEUE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER GESELLSCHAFTSRECHT [NZGJ 531 (2003); BETRIEB-
SBERATER 2004, 1868.
56. Grossfeld & Hoeltzenbrein, supra note 51.
57. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459 (1897).
58. N.Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
59. Avi-Yonah, supra note 28, at 1244.
60. Olubunmi Faleye, Cash and Corporate Control, 59 J. FIN. 2041 (2004).
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cannot put them on the same level with natural persons. They have to be
controlled by other means.
The lawyers' innocence in this respect is sometimes breathtaking. We
are concerned with all kinds of tax abracadabra, with too perfect theories
for too perfect solutions-making us appear like magicians for all sea-
sons.61 Right now we learn how firmly lawyers believed in the term "in-
surance broker" as a model for loyalty to clients. The Eliot Spitzer
"lecture" might have told us 62 about contingent commissions and bid-rig-
ging-the stuff of a dynastic epic. 63 Add to this the "tying" that occurs
when a broker tells insurers that he will work with them only if they also
commit to buying their reinsurance from him.64 The target broker's
shares lost 46 percent within a week, amounting to a loss of $11.5 bil-
lion.65 At the same time 3,000 employees lost their jobs. Brave new
world!66
We too had many pretty toys when young;
A law indifferent to blame or praise,
To bribe or threat; habits that made hold wrong
Melt down, as it were wax in the sun's rays;
Public opinion ripening for so long
We thought it would outlive all future days.
0 what fine thought we had because we thought
That the worst rogues and rascals had died out.
We pieced our thoughts into philosophy,
And planned to bring the word under a rule,
Who are but weasels fighting in a hole.67
Carefully observing imagination is more important than intelligent
hindsight following disasters in order to clean them up.
X. ACCOUNTING 68
Accounting is a prime example for the need of a new macro-legal ap-
proach. Money rules the world and the flow of money is activated and
61. Christopher H. Hanna, From Gregory to Enron: The Too Perfect Theory and Tax
Law, 24 VA. TAX REV. 737 (2005).
62. Henry G. Manne, Regulation 'in Terrorem,' WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at A14.
63. John C. Bogle, The Spitzer Effect, WALL ST. J., Nov. 18, 2004, at A18; Monica
Langley et al., Marsh Faces $500 Million in Penalties, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 2004, at
C1.
64. Timothy L. O'Brien & Joseph B. Treaster, Spitzer Goes Hunting for His Next Tro-
phy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, § 3, at 1.
65. Eliot's Insurance Policy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2004, at A18.
66. Jesse Eisinger, AIG's Chief Shows Signs of Humility as Spitzer Probe Rattles the
Industry, WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2004, at C1.
67. W.B. YEATS, Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF W.
B. YEATS 206 (Richard J. Finneran ed., 1933).
68. Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Accounting, 28 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 233 (1993);
Werner F. Ebke, Accounting, Auditing and Global Capital Markets, in
CORPORATIONS, CAPITAL MARKETS AND BUSINESS IN THE LAW 113 (Richard
Buxbaum ed., 2000).
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channelled through accounting. Even small adjustments in accounting
practice can have an enormous impact because of the large number of
people and dollars involved. Statistically relevant effects are the world of
accounting.
A. HISTORY
It is here that Sarbanes-Oxley's emphasis on auditing committee and
executive certification reaches global dimensions. Accounting becomes a
prime factor for a corporation's social credit world-wide. That is why in-
ternational standards are the order of the day; call them Generally Ac-
cepted Accounting Principles in the United States or International
Financial Reporting Standards in the European Union.69 Certainly, the
two sets compete with each other in a kind of numbers war, but it looks
as if tendencies towards convergence are emerging.70 These hopes are
also based on the fact that all rules of accounting have the same source:
Luca Pacioli's book Summa arithmetica, geometrica proportioni e propor-
tionalita published in Venice in 1494. Anyhow, comparative law faces
new challenges. 71 Both sets of rules, even when equal or similar in lan-
guage, operate and are interpreted in the context of different cultural pat-
terns of order.72
B. IMPACT
The impact of these rules is dramatic. Present value concepts push
aside historical cost accounting, hidden reserves are largely outlawed.
Earnings turn out to be more volatile, and the need for equity capital
becomes more urgent. The interaction of the rules with corporate valua-
tion techniques and with rating will be discussed later.73 In both sets,
accounting for the good will of subsidiaries under the good will impair-
ment test increases volatility.74
European accounting firms are directly involved with U.S. corporate
governance when they prepare or furnish an audit report with respect to
69. Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Accounting: Where Internet Meets Geography, 48 AM.
J. COMP. L. 261 (2000); Comparative Corporate Governance, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 847 (2003).
70. Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparatists and Languages, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUD-
IES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 154 (Pierre Legrand & Roger Munday eds.,
2003).
71. Bernhard Grossfeld, Comparative Law as a Comprehensive Approach, 1 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & Bus. 1 (2000); Bernhard Grossfeld, CORE QUESTIONS OF COMPARA-
TIVE LAW (Vivian Grosswald Curran trans., 2004); Richard S. Markowits, Learning
from Foreigners: A Response to Justice Scalia's and Professor Levinson's Profes-
sional Moral Parochialism, 39 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 367 (2004).
72. Bernhard Grossfeld & Ed Eberle, Patterns of Order in Comparative Law: Discov-
ering and Decoding Invisible Powers, 38 TEX. INT'L L. J. 291 (2003); see also Basil
Markesinis, Scholarship, Reputation of Scholarship and Legacy-Provocative Re-
flections from a Comparatist's Point of View, 38 THE IR. JURIST 1 (2003).
73. Infra.
74. Bernhard Grossfeld, Cross-Border Mergers: Corporate Accounting/Corporate Val-
uation, 101 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR VERGLEICHENDE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
[ZVGLRWIss] 1 (2002).
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any issuer that is registered or should be registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission.75 In addition, the Public Company Account-
ing Oversight Board may determine that a foreign firm that does not is-
sue audit reports is treated the same as one that does issue audit reports if
it plays "a substantial role in the preparation and furnishing of such re-
ports. '76 I wonder whether this is applicable for audits of foreign subsidi-
aries that are to be included in a global group account. Sarbanes-Oxley
defines an "audit report" as a document or other record that is prepared
"for purposes of compliance by an issuer with the requirements of the
securities laws. ' 77
C. EXAMPLES
Accounting also tells us that there is no safety in numbers, that fuzzy
numbers are to be expected.78 I want to give two examples.
1. Earnings79
Accounting rules give wide discretion for estimates to calculate earn-
ings, leaving much to guessing. Given the pressure on management to
reach expected earnings, the results are foreseeable. Accrual accounting
allots revenues as earnings to specific periods in which they are not neces-
sarily received. 80 There is a "cult" around viewing quarterly numbers as
the firm's distilled health certificate, but unfortunately it is often a myth.
The art (or charade) of earnings management is widespread.81 The ana-
lysts' estimates of earnings are miraculously beat by a penny! Manage-
ment has many levers to pull to make their numbers: optimistic
adjustments for sales inflate earnings, pessimistic ones store earnings for
thinner times. Understating bad debts raises earnings, overstating them
leads to higher profits when the estimates are reversed. Adjustments of
inventory have similar effects, as have forecasts on unusual gains and
losses.82 Earnings are merely opinions.
Of course, keeping stock prices high has a purpose: executive compen-
sation. Equity incentives in the form of stock options increase the moti-




77. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7201(a)(4)(A) (West 2004); cf. Elyse Freeman, The Impact of Post-
Enron Information Disclosure Requirements Imposed Under U.S. Law on Foreign
Investors, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 271 (2003).
78. David Henry, Fuzzy Numbers, Bus. WK., Oct. 4, 2004, at 79.
79. Id. at 80.
80. See ALEX BERENSON, THE NUMBER 227 (2003).
81. Gretchen Morgenson, Pennies That Aren't From Heaven, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2004
at B4.
82. Ellen E. Schultz, Ford and GM Get SEC Request on Pension Accounting Practices,
WALL ST. J. Oct. 20, 2004, at Al.
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2. Cash Flows83
We are not much better off with cash flows, which we tend to see as
facts. But even cash is not sacrosanct and can trumped up. Trade securi-
ties inflate operating cash flows when they are sold; this masks the volatil-
ity of the business. Cutting inventories and delaying payments to
suppliers raises cash flows but tends to hurt future growth. Selling receiv-
ables for less than face value increases cash immediately but reduces fu-
ture (otherwise higher) cash. But piles of cash flows do not just boost
liquidity; they may indicate a putting off of badly needed overhauls to cut
costs, and they may lure employees into tougher bargaining positions for
higher salaries. 84
All these "skills" have immediate consequences for valuation tech-
niques that turn around the volatility of earnings and cash flows. To the
extent that volatility can be manipulated the results of evaluations can be
manipulated. This helps to keep share prices higher than they might oth-
erwise be, which in turn can raise executive bonuses.
XI. VALUATION 85
"Valuation is an art rather than a science,"86 and "it is recognized that
the 'value' of property is not a concrete tangible attribute but an abstrac-
tion derived from the economic uses to which the property may be put."87
Accounting does not tell us the value of the firm-as the original good
will is not shown on the balance sheet. But it is this value that counts for
investors in case of emergency.
Here valuation techniques step in. They were originally limited to
merger or squeeze out situations but the new "good will impairment test"
makes them a regular pattern of accounting. 88 Due to the fact that mul-
tinational corporations have many foreign subsidiaries, even cross-border
valuation techniques become routine business. 89
The prevailing Discounting Cash Flow Method uses the beta factor to
measure a firm's individual volatility and hence the risk involved; it is a
kind of legal mathematics. But it looks more arithmetically trustworthy
83. Faleyes, supra note 60.
84. Evan Perez, Cross Winds: How Delta's Cash Cushion Pushed It onto Wrong
Course, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29, 2004, at Al.
85. Joshua Davis, Comment, Expected Value Arbitration, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 47 (2004);
Richard Weckstein, Real Discounting and Inflation in Indexed Treasury Securities,
53 DEF. L.J. 569 (2004).
86. In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213, 1221 (Del. 1992).
87. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976).
88. Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Financial Statements/Local Enterprise Valuation, 29 J.
CORP. L. 337 (2004).
89. Bernhard Grossfeld, Global Valuation: Geography and Semiotics, 55 SMU L. REV.
197 (2002); cf. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, National Regulation of Multinational Enter-
prises: An Essay on Comity, Exterritoriality and Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L. L. 5 (2003); Meritt B. Fox, What's so Special about Multinational
Enterprises?: A Comment on Avi-Yonah, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 55 (2004).
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than it really is. 9° Much depends on which market index is chosen and
for what period of time. In addition, the method is based on the efficient
market hypothesis, which is no longer uncontested. Markets might be
less effective than we have imagined.91 In any event, the evaluation of a
firm depends on sound accounting techniques - and that is a risk factor in
itself of particular proportion.
XII. FANNIE MAE/FREDDIE MAC92
So far, we have discussed accounting, valuation, and rating as more or
less isolated instruments of social control. But the macro-economic and
macro-legal consequences only become apparent when we see their inter-
actions, their statistical macro-justice. A prime example is the recent
story of Fannie Mae and its smaller rival Freddie Mac, the two U.S. hous-
ing finance giants. They deserve a more detailed case study. These Gov-
ernment Sponsored Enterprises ("GSE"s) are federally chartered
(Fannie Mae1938, Freddie Mac 1970) as an aftermath of the Great De-
pression. Although they are owned by private shareholders, they have a
line of credit from the Treasury and exemption from state and local taxes.
As the mortgage finance duopoly they ensure a steady flow of funding
into the home mortgage market.93 These entities do this by buying mort-
gages from banks and other lenders and providing them with cash to
make new loans. Thus, these two firms own or guarantee roughly half of
the $7.9 trillion of U.S. mortgages outstanding.
Fannie Mae is the second-largest financial institution in the United
States. Year after year it had shown non-volatile earnings, telling us that
its business was not risky. But on Sept. 22, 2004 a bombshell exploded:
the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight ("OFHEO") accused
the firm of having routinely "smoothened" its quarterly earnings to make
them appear less choppy than they really were in order to reduce the
costs of refinancing. 94 The argument is that Fannie Mae incorrectly ap-
plied rule FAS 133 to spread out losses over many years rather than tak-
ing an immediate hit.95 Fannie Mae might also have taken too much
leeway under rule FAS 91 by not correctly adjusting the rate of amortiza-
90. Bernhard Grossfeld & Ruediger Stoever, Der Betafaktor in der Unternehmen-
sbewertung, BETRIEBSBERATER 2799 (2004).
91. Jon E. Hilsenrath, As Two Economists Debate the Markets, The Tide Shifts, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 18, 2004, at Al; Werner F. M. De Bondt & Richard H. Thaler, Do
Security Analysts Overreact?, in QUASI RATIONAL ECONOMics 301(Richard H.
Thaler ed., 1991).
92. Howard Husock, It's Time to Call in the Loan to Fan and Fred, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Sept. 28, 2004, at A8; James R. Hagerty & John D. McKinnon, Fannie Mae's Board
Submits to Crackdown by Regulators, WALL ST. J at Ml; Jonathan Weil & John D.
McKinnon, Fannie Mae Seeks an Ally in SEC, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2004, at C1.
93. James R. Hagerty, Freddie Gains on Fannie by Putting Its Troubles Behind, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 24, 2004, at C1.
94. Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight, Report of Findings to Date, Spe-
cial Examination of Fannie Mae, at i-ii (Sept. 17, 2004), available at http://www.
ofheo.gov/media/pdf/FNMfindingstodatel7sept04.pdf.
95. Id. at i.
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tion for premiums and discounts on loans when interest rates changed. 96
It is alleged that billions of dollars of losses on options and other deriva-
tive contracts designated to hedge interest-rate risks had been deferred
through faulty accounting techniques. 97
If these allegations are correct, Fannie Mae's business was riskier than
admitted. They may have used non-standard accounting techniques to
reassure markets that earnings were stable. If the price to earnings ratio
of shares holds steady even as interest rates for mortgages change, it
looks like a supreme performance. This appearance provides a higher
rating and improves the margin between the interest earned on home
mortgages in its portfolio and its own borrowing costs. It also increases
the value of the firm. 98
Within a week of the OFHEO intervention Fannie Mae's stock shares
lost 15 percent of their value.99 All of the sudden there appears on the
horizon a money pinch; Fannie Mae might have to post an after-tax loss
of $9 billion on a core capital of $38 billion.100 Fannie Mae's executives
"will now have to explain why anyone should believe a word they say."101
The accounting policy has implications far beyond the individual firm.
Steady earnings and a calm market reassure Capitol Hill and deter any
changes in the rules, making private competition very difficult. In addi-
tion, it gives huge political clout: Fannie Mae has bipartisan legions of
lobbyists to protect its franchise value. 102
XIII. PENSION ACCOUNTING
Pension accounting is another field of high interest. To what extent can
firms use pension and health benefits funds to adjust their earnings?
Given the huge pension and retiree-benefits obligations, the flexibility of
accounting rules also gives corporations the chance to mint income and to
ease swings in earnings. For purposes of earnings management corpora-
tions just change assumptions within their benefits plans or cut benefits.
This shows less volatility and risks; shareholders are generally unaware of
these effects.
96. Id.
97. Id. at vii.
98. Hagerty, supra note 93.
99. Paul M. Sherer, Mortgage-Securities Investors Face Little Risk Amid Crisis, Wall St.
J., Sept. 29, 2003, at D3.
100. Jonathan Weil, Mortgage Giant Is in a Money Pinch, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 27,
2004, at 1A.; James R. Hagerty, Fannie Warns of $9 Billion Loss if Derivatives
Ruling Is Adverse, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 2004, at A3.
101. Fannie Uncovered, WALL ST. J. EUR., Sept. 24, 2004, at A10.
102. John R. Wilke, Fannie, Freddie Regulator Is Split Over Moves to Toughen Over-
sight, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at A2.
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XIV. RATING 10 3
Da mihi facta, dabo tibi iu ("Give me the facts, then I will give you
the law"). 10 4
So far we have concentrated on internal monitoring to keep corporate
power in line with social expectations. But, though we agree that a board
of directors with independent members can do a lot, we also know that
independence means staying on distance - and this is a rare quality within
a society that cheers networking.10 5 Therefore, we must turn to other
forms of monitoring, that is, to external monitoring. 10 6
Rating has risen to the highest ranks in financing and corporate con-
trol. It triggers the power of interests and compound interests; it chan-
nels the cash flow of justice: the higher the rating, the lower the interest
rate the borrower must pay. It is booming far beyond the rating agen-
cies-it is invading all layers of business. Because the management of a
firm is risk oriented first, the risk factor is equally important for any cor-
porate group.
But rating is not just isolated credit scoring. It is slowly moving towards
corporate governance scoring: how transparent is the governance system,
how effective are internal controls? 10 7 Here traditional aspects of corpo-
ration law merge with the exigencies of rating. Corporate and corporate-
groups structures are risk and transparency-driven. Unfortunately, law-
yers-so far-have not discussed the issues. But management's fiduciary
duties with regard to particular actions might be reviewed for how they
influence the ratings and, thereby, the costs of capital.
XV. BASEL II
The New Basel Capital Accord ("Basel II"), the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision "International Convergence of Capital Measure-
ment and Capital Standards," opens a new chapter in rating.10 8 It sets up
international standards for the regulation of banks to encourage market
discipline through disclosure requirements. This will spill over to all
fields of risk evaluation. Basel II has three pillars: (1) minimum capital
requirements, (2) supervisory review of capital adequacy, and (3) public
disclosure. 10 9 These pillars are designed to establish levels of capital for
internationally active banks. The applicable formula is based on the con-
cept of a capital ratio, where the nominator represents the bank's capital
and the denominator the risk-weighted assets. The resulting ratio may be
no less than 8 percent. You see that the definitions of risks (credit risk
103. Grossfeld, Changing Concepts, supra note 22.
104. Id.
105. Cf. Arthur Levitt Jr., Money, Money, Money, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2004, at A14.
106. Udo Braendle & Juergen Noll, The Power of Monitoring, 5 GERMAN L.J. 11
(2004).
107. Phyllis Plitch, Tracking the Numbers! Street Sleuth: S&P Finds Good Governance
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and market risk) and the rules of accounting are decisive. 110 In cross-
border transactions, problems of how to translate financial information
acquire a central role. 1 Comparative law reaches a new realm.1 1 2
XVI. LEGAL RELEVANCE
A. ACCOUNTING
The traditional view might not immediately recognize the legal impor-
tance of these new factors in corporate governance, but they reach far
beyond our micro-legal view into macro-legal proportions. 1 3 But why
should lawyers know about these technical fields, and where does their
special knowledge come into play? Let us put together some examples.
I want to mention the auditing committees that have spread under
Sarbanes-Oxley. To be a member of such committees means sitting on a
very hot seat; it is particularly hot for the at least one "financial expert"
who has to be a member of every auditing committee. 11 4 The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act defines this "financial expert" as follows: he has to have
through "education and experience [you hear the word "education?"] an
understanding of generally accepted accounting principles and financial
statements." 11 5 The required "experience" includes "an understanding of
audit committee functions."11 6 It goes without saying that they cannot
work without expert information. Could this be a professional alley for
law students?
Another example is accountants' liability, an equally hot issue after En-
ron.117 Certainly, Bily v. Arthur Young and Co118 did much to alleviate a
heavy burden, but Enron might have changed this as well. Lawyers who
want to represent accountants should know more of their clients' world.
As far as details are concerned, I do not want to discuss again the ques-
tions of how options are to be accounted for. But lawyers should at least
have an idea of how they can be abused through timing. It is tempting for
every chief executive officer to manage the timing of an option re-pricing
date opportunistically. Options are systematically timed to coincide with
110. Bank for International Settlements, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, In-
ternational Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards (June
2004), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsl07.htm.
111. Grossfeld & Hoeltzenbein, supra note 51.
112. GROSSFELD, CORE QUESTIONS OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 71.
113. The term was coined by Alfred Conard from the University of Michigan School of
Law.
114. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); see also
Class Action Sarbox, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 2006, at A6 (opinion).
115. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7265 (West 2002).
116. § 7265.
117. Jonathan D. Schneider, The Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise and the
Scandalous Fall of Enron by Bethany McLean and Peter Elkind, 25 ENERGY L.J.
441 (2004) (book review).
118. Bily v. Arthur Young & Co., 834 P.2d 745 (Cal. 1992).
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favourable movement in the company's stock price. 119
B. VALUATION
Likewise booming is the field of valuation - it is sufficient to mention
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.120 and its aftermath. Valuation has become a
lawyer's "paradise."' 121 An additional push comes from the "good will
impairment test" 122 that makes the valuation of subsidiaries a standard
technique for financial statements.
C. RATING 12
3
Rating appears to be a black box for lawyers. The big three rating
agencies ostensibly function as a disinterested priesthood: they wield
power through letter grades they hand out.124 Certainly there is some
discussion about regulations for rating agencies and their potential liabil-
ity, but so far very little is known about the rating techniques, including
what they are and what they should be. The process itself has remained a
mystery of finance. But "correct" ratings will give rise to numerous litig-
ious questions, as the agencies get the bulk of their revenues from the
entities they are rating. Under Basel 11,125 rating will become a matter of
concern for practically all firms; cross-border ratings will soon add a
global touch.
XVII. LAW SCHOOLS 126
Ye lawyers, who live upon litigants' fees,
And who need a good many to live at your ease;
Grave or gay, wise or witty, whate'er your degree,
Plain stuff or Queen's Counsel, take counsel of me.127
A. NEW WINE
What does all this mean for law schools? Now, the question is, whether
we may continue to celebrate the "old wine" approach? Does share-
holder value paint a real situation? Is it just a trick to minimize capital
costs and to keep control of an ever-growing cash flow in the hands of a
119. Sandar Renfro Callaghan et al., The Timing of Option Repricing, 59 J. FIN. 1651,
1674 (2004). For the tax implications, see John R. Graham et al., Employee Stock
Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt Policy, 59 J. FIN. 1585 (2004).
120. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983); cf. Grossfeld, Changing Con-
cepts, supra note 22.
121. Bernhard Grossfeld, Lawyers and Accountants: A Semiotic Competition, 36 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 167 (2001).
122. Id.
123. Alec Klein, Borrowers Find System Open to Conflicts, Manipulation, WASH. POST,
Nov. 22, 2004, at Al.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. M.C. Mirow, Globalizing Property: Incorporating Comparative and International
Law into First-Year Property Classes, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 183 (2004).
127. Summary of Events, 7 AM. L. REV. 387 (1872-1873).
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small group?' 2 8 The traditional history of corporate law 129 saw Delaware
as a "powerful force . . for convergence on an efficient model,"1 30 and
most commentators came to the conclusion that "the ideological and
competitive attractions" of shareholder primacy "will become undis-
putable.' a3 1 Accounting (though briefly mentioned), valuation, and rat-
ing did not form part of the great scheme. This happened a short time
before Enron (not a Delaware corporation) and before Sarbanes-Oxley
federalized U.S. corporation law. But we had already learned that Dela-
ware could only operate within a frame drawn by federal law.' 32 Dela-
ware was opportunistic in adjusting. Had we really attended to the forces
that had driven Enron and its colleagues? Are we teaching corporation
law from hindsight to clean up or from foresight to establish best
practices?
B. PROPOSALS
It is not my idea that we should turn lawyers into accountants. But to
those who want to understand the corporate society, we should give a
chance to find out what the relevant issues are, and we should prepare
them for an intelligent and sustained discussion with accountants. Let's
open windows and let's encourage their willingness to learn. We should
introduce them briefly to the basics of double accounting, which can be
explained in two hours, and into the structure of financial reporting. Top-
ics could be the function of the balance sheet to show equity capital as the
balance between assets and liabilities, and the elements of cash flows and
accrual accounting. Add to this the difference between cash flows and
profits and the role of the income statement. Indispensable is a short
introduction into group accounts and the concept of consolidation. Com-
pletely up to date would be a discussion of the good will impairment test.
That's it; a two hour course is sufficient. Introduction and motivation are
the core-leave everything else to learning when going ahead.
Most important, however, the course should be taught from a law
school's perspective, keeping constantly in mind what can be expected
from law students, for whom it is just a window opening course. If ac-
counting were as difficult to learn as it is sometimes presented by the
''priests" or "gatekeepers," there would not be so many accountants
around.
XVIII. CONCLUSION
"There is nothing like a dream to create the future." 133
128. Faleye, supra note 60.
129. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 7.
130. Id. at 454.
131. Id. at 468.
132. Roe, supra note 33.
133. See FLORENCE LITTAUER, DARE TO DREAM 50 (W Publishing Group, 1994)
(quoting Victor Hugo).
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Though poetry is not the lawyer's first task, I did not want to miss it on
this very occasion, when the memory of Ibrahim Shihata might encourage
us to do our job as wholeheartedly as he did his. The world is darker and
deeper than we imagined when we pursued a career in law; probably we
were sometimes even misguided by great words about "justice" and the
power of our concepts. Ibrahim Shihata was driven by his experience
that a chaotic environment (at least it looks chaotic to the human mind)
challenges all of our talents and all of our integrity. Similarly, the stu-
dent's eyes make the professor run. I would like to come to an end with a
quote from Robert Frost:
The woods are lovely, dark and deep.
But I have promises to keep,
And miles to go before I sleep,
And miles to go before I sleep. 134
Requiesquat in pacem! We should honor the example that Ibrahim
Shihata set by trying to leave our footprints on the sands of time.
134. ROBERT FROST, Stopping By Woods On A Snowy Evening, in THE POETRY OF
ROBERT FROST: THE COLLECTED POEMS, COMPLETE AND UNABRIDGED 224 (Ed-
ward Connery Latham ed., 1979).
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